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Abstract—Bitcoin is a decentralized, pseudonymous cryp-
tocurrency that is one of the most used digital assets to date. Its
unregulated nature and inherent anonymity of users have led
to a dramatic increase in its use for illicit activities. This calls
for the development of novel methods capable of characterizing
different entities in the Bitcoin network.
In this paper, a method to attack Bitcoin anonymity is
presented, leveraging a novel cascading machine learning ap-
proach that requires only a few features directly extracted
from Bitcoin blockchain data. Cascading, used to enrich entities
information with data from previous classifications, led to
considerably improved multi-class classification performance
with excellent values of Precision close to 1.0 for each considered
class. Final models were implemented and compared using
different machine learning models and showed significantly
higher accuracy compared to their baseline implementation.
Our approach can contribute to the development of effective
tools for Bitcoin entity characterization, which may assist in
uncovering illegal activities.
Index Terms—Bitcoin analysis, Bitcoin anonymity, cascading
classifiers, entities classification, graph model, blockchain
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin was born in 2009 and since then
its value and popularity has been rapidly
increasing until its current state, in which
it is the most used, assessed and priced
cryptocurrency of all. Bitcoin is a pure peer-
to-peer cryptocurrency [25] where all trans-
actions are stored in a public shared ledger
called blockchain that cannot be manipu-
lated or changed [6]. Bitcoin is decentral-
ized, which means that it is not controlled
by any financial institution but it is regu-
lated by everyone in the Bitcoin network: its
blockchain architecture maintains the sys-
tem without ambiguity [26].
While transactions within the Bitcoin net-
work are openly available, Bitcoin user
identity is non-transparent and protected
by anonymity. This circumstance, combined
with the unregulated nature of the Bitcoin
market, has brought a lot of new actors to the
Bitcoin network using cryptocurrency for il-
licit operations. Approximately one-quarter
of Bitcoin users and half of all Bitcoin trans-
actions are associated with illegal activity
[9], accounting for an annual amount of
around $72 billion (report 2018).
Conventional law-enforcement strategies
tackling illegal financial operations such as
money laundering or transactions funding
criminal operations are typically based on
complete knowledge of each actor’s identity,
while details about financial transactions are
controlled by banks and thus unknown [24].
Within the Bitcoin network, these circum-
stances are reversed - incomplete knowledge
of identities restricts traceability and trans-
parency of operations, in turn promoting
further increase of illegal activities. This
calls for novel methods to attack anonymity
within the Bitcoin network, aiming to un-
cover Bitcoin entity categories.
Among the most active categories of en-
tities is the exchange, which represents a
digital marketplace where traders can buy
and sell cryptocurrencies using different fiat
(money made legal tender by a govern-
ment decree) or other digital currencies.
Exchanges thus constitute the ”front and
exit doors” to the cryptocurrency world
and are ideal to hide illicit operations, as
documented in [22]. Another category is
the darknet market. These markets are e-
commerce platforms where users can find
drugs, weapons and any kind of goods or
services that are illegal in most countries.
These cryptomarkets use electronic curren-
cies to facilitate licit and illicit transactions
among their users [5]. Further, so-called
mixers represent services that allow users to
obscure operations, as presented in [23]. At
the same time mixed transactions increase
the privacy of the users, and they can be used
for money laundering of illegal funds.
Being able to classify anonymous Bit-
coin entities according to such categories
would increase transparency and would fa-
cilitate linking blockchain information with
real actors to uncover illegal activities. Cur-
rent techniques attacking anonymity often
try to cluster addresses and apply heuristic
assumptions combined with labelled data
from external sources like markets, forums
or social media in order to determine ad-
dress owners in the real world [20]. How-
ever, gathering external data and combin-
ing them with Bitcoin information is te-
dious and could be limited due to privacy
restrictions. This motivates the implemen-
tation of a model able to characterize dif-
ferent behaviours in the Bitcoin network by
analyzing the pure blockchain information
only; by extracting transactions and by rec-
ognizing patterns using machine learning
approaches.
In this paper, we present a novel approach
to decrease Bitcoin anonymity based on a
cascading machine learning model, using
entity, address and motifs data as inputs. We
apply a ”cascade” of classifiers, performing
a first entity classification based on address,
1 motif, and 2 motif data, which is then
used as input for a second classification step,
which combines those classification results
with entity information from the blockchain.
Notably, our approach only requires a few
features that can be directly extracted from
Bitcoin blockchain data.
In order to compare benefits and limits
of the proposed approach, two experiments
are presented: firstly, a simple classifier is
trained based on pure entity information
gathered from the blockchain. In the second
experiment, a final classifier is trained us-
ing the enriched data set generated by our
cascading approach. We aimed to detect six
different types of Bitcoin entity behaviours.
Overall, three classifier models are tested
and compared: Adaboost, Random Forest
and Gradient Boosting.
The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. Section II describes the related
work. After that, Section III presents the
graph model used and Section IV shows an
overview of the used data sets. Section V
describes the implemented machine learn-
ing models and Section VI presents the ob-
tained results. Finally, in Section VII, we
draw conclusions and provide guidelines for
future work.
II. RELATED WORK
User anonymity has probably been the key
factor for the success of cryptocurrencies
and has promoted illegal activities within
the Bitcoin network. Yet, several studies
determine that current measures adopted by
the Bitcoin protocol are not sufficient to
protect the privacy of its users [19], [1],
opening up possibilities to attack Bitcoin
anonymity. One of the first transaction anal-
ysis is documented in [30] where typical be-
havior of Bitcoin users are detected based on
how they spend cryptocurrencies, how they
keep the balance in their accounts, and how
they move Bitcoins between their various
accounts. Herrera-Joancomartı´ [12] presents
a review on Bitcoin anonymity, concluding
that anonymity can be reduced by address
clustering or by gathering information from
various peer-to-peer networks. This tech-
nique is also advocated in [15], where con-
servative constraints (patterns) are applied
for address clustering, and in [17] where
information gathered from online forums
is used to characterize the CryptoLocker,
a family of ransomware. Similarly, in [8],
information scraped from online forums and
social media is determinant to simulate an
attacker and to summarize activity of both
known and unknown Bitcoin users. In [3],
a generic method to deanonymize a signifi-
cant fraction of Bitcoin users by correlating
their pseudonyms with public IP addresses
is described. Reid et al. [29] demonstrates
how it is possible to associate many public-
keys with each other, using a map of the
topological network and external identify-
ing information in order to investigate a
large theft of Bitcoins.
Several recent studies have exploited ma-
chine learning algorithms for Bitcoin analy-
sis. In [13], an unsupervised learning model
is presented with the aim to identify atypical
transactions related to money laundering.
Monamo et al. [21] introduce a k-means
classifier for object clustering and fraudu-
lent activity detection in Bitcoin transac-
tions. Another study on detection of anoma-
lous behavior, suspicious users and transac-
tions is presented in [27], where three un-
supervised learning methods are applied to
two graphs generated by the Bitcoin transac-
tion network. Further, a supervised machine
learning algorithm is used by [11] to un-
cover Bitcoin anonymity using a method for
predicting the type of yet-unidentified enti-
ties. In [2], data mining techniques are used
to implement and train a classifier to identify
Ponzi schemes in the Bitcoin blockchain
and in [18] a Bayesian optimized recurrent
neural network (RNN) and a Long Short
Term Memory (LSTM) are implemented
to predict the direction of Bitcoin price in
USD.
Recently, an interesting approach is given
in [28], where the concept of motifs is
introduced to blockchain analysis. Authors
performed an analysis of the transaction
directed hypergraph in order to identify
several distinct statistical properties of ex-
change addresses. They were able to predict
if an address is owned by an exchange with
> 80% accuracy. The introduction of hy-
pergraphs (or dirhypergraphs) proved bene-
ficial due to their significant advantages over
a complex graph structure typically derived
from Bitcoin networks. In [14], the motif
concept is further developed and is com-
bined with multiple features (entity, address,
temporal, centrality) to obtain a comprehen-
sive entity classification into five categories:
Exchange, Service, Gambling, Mining Pool
and DarkNet marketplace. Using a total
of 315 features, a global accuracy of 0.92
could be achieved.
Inspired by the good classification results
presented in [14], we present here a novel
machine-learning-based approach to attack
Bitcoin anonymity, making use of motifs as
introduced by Ranshous et al. and allow-
ing for multi-class classification of Bitcoin
entities as in [14], yet aiming to provide
a straightforward methodology that relies
on fewer, well-defined features. To achieve
this, we introduce a novel cascading ma-
chine learning model for Bitcoin data analy-
sis. The main idea is to implement a cascade
of classifiers, so that outgoing classification
results can be joined and can be used to
enrich a final classification.
III. GRAPH MODEL
A. Blockchain Graph Model
Bitcoin transactions have a natural graph
structure, with a fundamental example be-
ing the address-transaction graph (Figure 1).
This graph is directly obtained by using the
information gathered from the blockchain
and provides an estimation of the flow
of Bitcoins linking public key addresses
over time. The vertices represent the ad-
dresses (a1, a2, ..., aN) and the transactions
(tx1, tx2, ..., txM). The directed edges (ar-
rows) between entities and transactions in-
dicate the incoming relations, while directed
edges between transactions and entities cor-
respond to outgoing relations. Each directed
edge can also include additional features
such as values, time-stamps, etc.
Fig. 1: Example of address-transaction graph
To improve anonymity in the network,
users are encouraged to generate a new
Bitcoin address for each new transaction,
which is a common advice for the correct
usage of Bitcoin1. Due to this procedure,
several addresses belong to the same logi-
cal user, so that a simplification is possible
by introducing the concept of entities. An
entity is defined as person or organization
that controls or can control multiple public
key addresses. This definition allows us to
transform the address-transaction graph into
the entity-transaction graph (Figure 2).
Fig. 2: Example of entity-transaction graph obtained by
address clustering
The new graph is obtained by grouping
addresses belonging to the same user into
entities (address clustering). This operation
is not intuitive, however several heuristic
properties have already been presented with
the aim to help the clusterization process,
for example in [1], [15] and [7]. In the
obtained graph, vertices represent the en-
tities (e1, e2, ..., eK) and the transactions
(tx1, tx2, ..., txM). Similar to the address-
transaction graph, directed edges between
entities and transactions indicate the in-
coming relations, while directed edges be-
tween transactions and entities correspond
to outgoing relations. The entity-transaction
graph (2) summarizes the network well and
1https://bitcoin.org/en/protect-your-privacy
constitutes an easily understandable repre-
sentation of the money flow within the net-
work.
B. Motifs Graph Model
Graph motifs were introduced in [16] and
were motivated by applications in bioin-
formatics, specifically in metabolic network
analysis. However, as shown in Section II,
prior studies such as [28] have introduced
the concept of motifs to Bitcoin analysis.
In this paper, a definition of N motif is
used, starting from the generalized concept
introduced in [14].
Definition 1: A N motif is a path from
the entity-transaction graph with length 2N
that starts and ends with an entity. Let
(e1, .., eM) ∈ E be a class of entities and
(t1, .., tN) ∈ T be a class of transactions,
withM ≤ N + 1, then:
N motif = (e1, t1, ..., tN, eM)
in which at least one output from each trans-
action must be an input to the next transac-
tion.
The term branch is used here to refer to a
path in the motif graph that begins and ends
with an entity passing through exactly one
transaction. If a single branch of the graph
has the same entity as input and output
(ej = ej+1), the branch is called Direct Loop,
otherwise it is called Direct Distinct.
From the motif definition it is clear that
all transactions are ordered in time, which
means that τ(t1) < τ(t2) < .. < τ(tN),
where τ represents a transaction time.
Here, we use the 1 motif and 2 motif
concepts. The 1 motif represents the re-
lation between two entities (at least one
distinct), while the 2 motif is the relation
between three entities (at least one distinct)
involved in two consecutive transactions.
IV. DATA OVERVIEW
We considered the whole Bitcoin
blockchain data created until February
5th 2019, 08:13:31 AM, corresponding
to 561,620 blocks, which contain about
380,000,000 transactions and involve more
than 1,000,000,000 addresses. This data was
then combined with information available
on the WalletExplorer2, a benchmark
platform for entities detection, which
represents a collection of information about
different known entities that have been
detected until today. The data set is thus
composed of 311 different samples, divided
into six classes (see Table I):
• Exchange: entities that allow their cus-
tomers to trade fiat currencies for Bit-
coins (or vice versa)
• Service: entities that offer Bitcoin pay-
ment methods as solutions to their busi-
ness (financial services, trading, lend-
ing, etc.)
• Gambling: entities that offer gambling
services (casino, betting, roulette, etc.)
• Mining Pool: entities composed of a
group of miners that work together shar-
ing their resources in order to reduce the
volatility of their returns
• Mixer: entities that offer a service to
obscure the traceability of their clients’
transactions
• Marketplace: entities allowing to buy
any kind of goods or services that are
illegal in most countries paying with
Bitcoin
As shown in Table I, the Exchange is the
top class represented by more than 60%
2https://www.walletexplorer.com/
Class Abbreviation # Entities # Address % Address
Exchange Ex 137 9,943,512 61.63
Gambling Gmb 76 3,054,238 18.93
Marketplace Mrk 20 2,349,210 14.56
Mining Pool Pool 25 76,104 0.47
Mixer Mxr 37 475,714 2.95
Service Serv 16 235,629 1.46
Total 311 16,134,407 100
TABLE I: Overview of WalletExplorer data used for this
study
of samples, while the Mining Pool class is
the least represented with just 0.47% (even
though it has more distinct entities than the
Marketplace and the Service).
Cross-references between Bitcoin
blockchain data and labelled data from
the WalletExplorer allow us to re-size
the original data set by removing all the
unlabelled and unusable data. As such, we
focus our analysis on known entities only.
From this new data set, four dataframes (2-
dimensional labelled data structure or data
table with samples as rows and extracted
features as columns) were extracted for the
proposed analysis:
• Entity dataframe contains all features
related to an entity that can be directly
extracted from the blockchain. They
are: the amount of BTC received/sent,
the balance of the entity, the num-
ber of transactions in which this entity
is the receiver/sender, and the number
of addresses belonging to this entity
used for receiving/sending money. (This
dataframe was composed of 311 sam-
ples and 7 features)
• Address dataframe contains all features
related to Bitcoin addresses. Features
are: the number of transactions in which
a certain address is detected such as
receiver/sender, the amount of BTC re-
ceived/sent from/to this address, the
balance, uniqueness (if this address is
just used in one transaction) and sib-
lings. (This dataframe was composed of
16,134,407 samples and 7 features)
• 1 motif dataframe contains the informa-
tion directly extracted from the 1 motif
graph. In this case, each row contains:
the amount received/sent in the transac-
tion, number of distinct addresses used
for receiving/sending money, number
of similar received/sent transactions be-
tween the entities in the branch, the fee,
and if the branch realizes a Direct Loop
or Direct Distinct path. (This dataframe
was composed of 58,076,963 samples
and 9 features)
• 2 motif dataframe contains information
gathered from the 2 motif graph. The
features analyzed are: the number of
addresses as input/output for the first
and second path in 2 motif graph, the
amount received/sent in the first and
second branch, the fee of both con-
sidered transactions, number of similar
sent transactions between the entities
in the first and second branch, Direct
Loop or Direct Distinct path for the first
and the second branch and Direct Loop
or Direct Distinct path considering the
whole 2 motif path, see Figure 3. (This
dataframe was composed of 83,443,055
samples and 18 features)
Fig. 3: 2 motif representation with extracted features high-
lighted
V. MACHINE LEARNING
A. Classifier Models
To demonstrate benefits and limits of our
approach, we conducted two different ex-
periments. Firstly, we created a simple clas-
sifier, called C entity (Figure 4), merely
based on the samples stored in the entity
dataframe, containing (seven) entity-related
features that can be directly extracted from
the blockchain. This classifier was evaluated
via a cross-validation process (see Section
V-B). Results from cross-validation were
considered as our baseline classification.
The simple classifier was implemented in
three versions applying Adaboost, Random
Forest and Gradient Boosting models as
those previously yielded good classification
results for Bitcoin data [28].
Fig. 4: First experiment: simple entities classifier
In the second experiment, prior to entity
classification according to the six classes
(Table I), we built three separate classi-
fiers, based on the additionally available
address, 1 motif, and 2 motif dataframes
and their respective features (7 + 9 +
18 = 34 features). Outgoing information
from these classifications was processed, as
shown in Figure 6, in order to create a
set of six new features for each classifier,
which were then used to enrich (extend) the
entity dataframe. Finally, a new classifier
C final was generated to obtain final entity
classification based on this enriched entity
dataframe and its 25 features (7 belonged
to the entity dataframe and 6x3 were gen-
erated from the three classifiers C address,
C motif1, C motif2). With this cascading
approach, new entity-related characteris-
tics were added to the entity dataframe,
ultimately improving the classification as
demonstrated in the following sections.
The first step was to split the address,
1 motif and 2 motif dataframes into two
parts called A-data set (for training) and B-
data set (for testing) with a proportion of
70/30. The A-data set was used to com-
pute cross-validation of the three C address,
C motif1, C motif2 classifier models (Fig-
ure 5). After that, the B-data set was used
as input for the trained classifiersC address,
C motif1, C motif2 in order to obtain clas-
sification results based on completely new,
unseen data.
Fig. 5: Second experiment: cascading entities classifiers
Classification results essentially assign
one of the six possible output classes to
each entry in the input dataframe. As each
entry has its original (ground truth) label
obtained from the WalletExplorer, we can
join input label and computed output class
and perform a group-by and count operation
as illustrated in Figure 6: we count how
many times a sample belonging to a par-
ticular entity has been detected in each of
the considered classes. This value is then
normalized as indicated in the following
formula:
∀ξ ∈ E
‖ P ξ| j ‖∑N
i=1 ‖ P ξ| i ‖
∗100 with j ∈ N
where E is the entities set and N rep-
resents the number of considered classes
(N = 6 in this study). The term ‖ P ξ| j ‖
represents how many times a sample origi-
nally labelled with entity ξ generates a pre-
diction belonging to the class j, while the
term
∑N
i=1 ‖ P ξ| i ‖ counts all the predic-
tions generated from samples with labelled
input belonging to entity ξ.
These normalized values form a dataframe
containing 311 samples (one for each
known entity as in the entity dataframe) and
six new features, representing the percent-
age of being classified as belonging to one
of the six classes. These features were added
to the entity dataframe for data enrichment,
constituting our cascading machine learning
system. The elements of the enriched entity
dataframe were used to implement and eval-
uate the final classifier, called C final, and a
cross-validation process (Section V-B) was
applied to compute its performance.
To allow for better comparison between
experiments, we implemented all classifier
models C address, C motif1, C motif2 and
C final with Adaboost, Random Forest and
Gradient Boosting models. Specifically, all
Adaboost classifiers were generated with
the number of estimators set to 50 and the
learning rate set to 1. All Random Forest
models were implemented with the number
of estimators set to 10, a Gini function to
measure the quality of the split and without
a maximum depth of the tree. All Gradient
Boosting models were implemented with
the number of estimators set to 100, the
learning rate set to 0.1 and the maximum
Output
Class
1 Ex
2 Gmb
3 Pool
4 Ex
5 Mxr
6 Mxr
… …
N Ex
WalletExplorer
entity name
Ex Gmb Mrk Pool Mxr Serv
1 Kraken.com 6333 44 25 12 3 1
2 BitcoinFog 225 60 7 1 2351 7
… … … … … … … …
j-1 Bittrex.com 9980 13 5 1 1 0
j SilkRoad2Market 6 1 994 0 0 0
… … … … … … … …
311 BTCCPool 915 84 14 4842 5 2
C_Address
# distinct entities = 311
# of features M = 7
# of samples N = 16,134,407
2. Classification
1. Adaboost
2. Random Forest
3. Gradient Boosting
# distinct output classes = 6
[Exchange, Gambling, Mixer, Pool, Market, 
Service]
3. Join
Data are grouped by WalletExplorer entity name
and output classes generating 311 elements
5. Normalization & Join
U
Entity Dataframe
Elements are normalized and added to the entity dataframe
1. Extract Dataframe
4. GroupBy & Count
Input data are joined with output 
data (classification results)
WalletExplorer
entity name
Address 1 2 … M
1 Bittrex.com a1 … … … …
2 SilkRoad2Market a2 … … … …
3 BTCCPool a3 … … … …
4 Kraken.com a4 … … … …
5 BitcoinFog a5 … … … …
6 Bittrex.com a6 … … … …
… … … … … … …
N Bittrex.com aN … … … …
WalletExplorer
entity name
Output
Class
1 Bittrex.com Ex
2 SilkRoad2Market Gmb
3 BTCCPool Pool
4 Kraken.com Ex
5 BitcoinFog Mxr
6 Bittrex.com Mxr
… … …
N Bittrex.com Ex
WalletExplorer
entity name
Ex 
%
Gmb 
%
Mrk 
%
Pool 
%
Mxr 
%
Serv 
%
1 Kraken.com 98.64 0.69 0.39 0.19 0.05 0.03
2 BitcoinFog 8.49 2.25 0.25 0.03 88.71 0.27
… … … … … … … …
j-1 Bittrex.com 99.80 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.01 0
j SilkRoad2Market 0.59 0.07 99.34 0 0 0
… … … … … … … …
311 BTCCPool 15.61 1.44 0.24 82.6 0.08 0.03
Fig. 6: Steps to create the enriched entity dataframe applied
to an example address dataframe
depth for limiting the number of nodes set
to 3.
B. Evaluation Metrics
All classification models were evaluated
by extracting and comparing classification
metrics via a cross-validation process. The
goal of cross-validation is to analyze the
prediction capabilities of the model in order
to detect problems such as over-fitting or
selection bias [4]. Here, we used stratified
K-fold cross-validation, with a value of K
equal to 5. This method involves dividing
the whole data set into K equal partitions or
folds.
Each fold is composed of data ensuring
a good representative sample of the whole
population by keeping the same proportion
of classes present in the original data set
(stratification). Then, K-1 folds are used to
train the model and the one left-out fold is
used to evaluate the predictions obtained by
the trained model. The entire process is re-
peated K times, until each fold has been left
out once, testing all possible combinations.
During this process, the following metrics
were computed:
• Accuracy or Score is defined as the num-
ber of correct predictions divided by the
total number of predictions and is given
as percentage
• Precision is the number of positive pre-
dictions divided by the total number of
the positive class values predicted. It
represents a measure of a classifier’s ex-
actness given as a value between 0 and
1, with 1 relating to high precision
• Recall represents a measure of a clas-
sifier’s completeness given as a value
between 0 and 1
• F1-score is the harmonic mean of Preci-
sion and Recall. It takes values between
0 and 1, with 1 relating to perfect Preci-
sion and Recall
F 1score = 2 ∗
Precision ∗ Recall
Precision +Recall
• Matthews Correlation Coefficient
(MCC) is a metric yielding easy
comparison with respect to a random
baseline, suitable for unbalanced
classes. It takes values between −1 and
+1. A coefficient of +1 represents a
perfect prediction, 0 an average random
prediction and−1 an inverse prediction.
As shown in [10], let K be the number
of classes and C be a confusion matrix
with dims K × K , the MCC can be
calculated as:
MCC part1 =
√∑
k
(
∑
l
Ckl)(
∑
f,g|f 6=g
Cgf)
MCC part2 =
√∑
k
(
∑
l
C lk)(
∑
f,g|f 6=g
C fg)
MCC =
∑
k
∑
l
∑
mCkkC lm − CklCmk
MCC part1 ∗MCC part2
In Section VI results for the baseline
model (C entity) and for the final model
obtained after cross-validation using the en-
riched dataframe (C final) are presented and
compared. We report global metric values
for Accuracy/Score andMCC averaged over
the K=5 cross-validation runs and per-class
values for Precision, Recall and F1-score
when evaluating the final models.
C. Hardware and Software Configuration
All analyses were run on a cluster of three
virtual machines, each one with 16 CPUs
Intel(R) Xeon(R) Silver 4114 CPU @ 2.20
GHz, 64 GB RAM DDR4 memory with
2, 666 MHz, and 500 GB of Hard Disk
SATA. Apache Spark3 v2.4.0, set in cluster
mode was used to manage stored data us-
ing Apache Hadoop4. The various classifier
models were implemented and evaluated us-
ing Python’s Scikit-learn5 library. All scripts
were executed within the Jupyter-notebook6
environment.
VI. RESULTS
Considering the simple classifier C entity
from the first experiment, the Gradient
Boosting model yielded a better average
score (61.90% accuracy) and MCC (0.44)
than Random Forest and Adaboost classi-
fiers, as shown in Table II (upper section).
3https://spark.apache.org/
4https://hadoop.apache.org/
5https://scikit-learn.org/
6https://jupyter.org/
However, with overall lowMCC for all clas-
sifiers (between 0.22 and 0.44), these scores
were not sufficient to achieve reliable enti-
ties characterization. This led to introducing
our cascading machine learning approach,
enriching the initial entity dataframe with
information gathered from prior classifica-
tions in the second experiment.
Model Classifier Score % Std % MCC
Adaboost C entity 45.63 6.34 0.22
Random Forest C entity 59.71 1.82 0.41
Gradient Boosting C entity 61.90 1.36 0.44
Adaboost C final 78.84 1.76 0.76
Random Forest C final 98.04 1.22 0.97
Gradient Boosting C final 99.68 0.63 0.99
TABLE II: Average performance of classifiers over five
cross-validation repetitions for simple C entity model
(above) and for final model after data enrichment via cas-
cading machine learning C final
Analyzing the C address, C motif1 and
C motif2 classifiers separately for entity
characterization, Table III shows that out-
going information from the Random Forest
classifier resulted to be more accurate than
information from Gradient Boosting and
Adaboost classifiers (accuracy scores>90%
for Random Forest). Notably, only using
information from the address dataframe, the
Random Forest classifier C address could
already achieve an average global accuracy
of ∼ 96%. Due to these results, we only
used results obtained from Random For-
est classifiers for the subsequent entities
dataframe enrichment. Random Forest clas-
sifiers not only proved to be the best in terms
of accuracy, but also performed with highest
speed among the considered classification
models.
The final classifiers C final were fed with
the enriched entity dataframe, which com-
prised the original features from the entity
dataframe and included as new features the
class predictions obtained from C address,
Model C address % C motif1 % C motif2 %
Adaboost 61.54 72.69 78.27
Random Forest 95.73 94.14 90.88
Gradient Boosting 83.23 83.52 83.54
TABLE III: Average global C address, C motif1 and
C motif2 classifier accuracy calculated via 5-fold cross-
validation
C motif1 and C motif2 for the respective
test data sets. From Table II (lower section)
it is obvious that the average score result
improved significantly by exploiting the in-
formation obtained via our cascading ap-
proach. Random Forest and Gradient Boost-
ing classifiers again performed better than
the Adaboost model, reaching a score of
more than 98% (respectively ∼ 39% and ∼
38% percentage points higher than the base-
line accuracy from C entity). Furthermore,
classification results were more stable dur-
ing cross-validation, generating low stan-
dard deviations between 0.63% and 1.76%
and the MCC reached values close to 1.0,
relating to close-to-perfect class prediction.
In Table IV, we present per-class Preci-
sion, Recall and F1-scores calculated for
C entity (baseline) and C final (enriched)
classifiers for each classification model. Re-
sults demonstrate that the simple classifier
C entity - independently of the classification
model used - had problems detecting Ser-
vice and Market entities (calculated metrics
are 0 or have very low values). However,
it is to be noted that these two classes are
least represented in terms of distinct entities
in the original data set. Random Forest and
Gradient Boosting classifiers showed over-
all good performance in detecting Mixer
entities for the C entity approach (F1-scores
>0.8).
By exploiting the cascading machine
learning implementation however, all clas-
C entity model C final model
Class Model Precision Recall F1-score Precision Recall F1-score
Exchange Adaboost 0.51 0.68 0.57 0.77 0.78 0.77
Gambling Adaboost 0.22 0.14 0.17 0.75 1.00 0.85
Market Adaboost 0.05 0.15 0.08 0.40 0.30 0.33
Mining Pool Adaboost 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.11 0.2 0.14
Mixer Adaboost 0.69 0.78 0.71 1.00 0.98 0.99
Service Adaboost 0.20 0.10 0.13 0.95 0.95 0.95
Exchange Random Forest 0.60 0.77 0.67 0.96 1.00 0.98
Gambling Random Forest 0.54 0.50 0.51 1.00 1.00 1.00
Market Random Forest 0 0 0 1.00 0.85 0.91
Mining Pool Random Forest 0.68 0.50 0.56 1.00 0.92 0.96
Mixer Random Forest 0.89 0.78 0.82 1.00 1.00 1.00
Service Random Forest 0 0 0 1.00 0.93 0.96
Exchange Gradient Boosting 0.61 0.80 0.69 1.00 1.00 1.00
Gambling Gradient Boosting 0.59 0.53 0.55 0.99 1.00 0.99
Market Gradient Boosting 0.10 0.05 0.06 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mining Pool Gradient Boosting 0.38 0.40 0.38 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mixer Gradient Boosting 0.92 0.84 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.00
Service Gradient Boosting 0 0 0 1.00 0.93 0.96
TABLE IV: Average Precision, Recall and F1-score calculated in each model implementation for each class
sifiers improved their classification perfor-
mance for each class, with most values be-
ing close to 1.0. Only the Adaboost model
kept having problems with the classification
ofMining Pool andMarket entities. Random
Forest and the Gradient Boosting models in-
stead yielded excellent values for Precision,
Recall and F1-score for each class.
Overall best classification scores were
achieved by theC final implementation with
Gradient Boosting models. Data enrichment
through prior classification and cascading
thus clearly had a highly beneficial impact
on classification ability of Gradient Boost-
ing, motivating a further analysis of the
importance of individual features from the
enriched entity dataframe. We therefore cal-
culated in a next step a feature importance
score for the enriched entity dataframe.
Generally, the feature importance score
provides a score that indicates how useful
or valuable each feature was in the con-
struction of the model. The more often an
attribute is used to make key decisions,
the greater will be its relative importance
score. Importance was explicitly calculated
through Python’s Scikit-learn library for
Fig. 7: Top 15 important features from the GB classifier
each attribute in the data set, allowing fea-
tures to be ranked and compared to each
other.
Figure 7 shows a list of the top fifteen
features for the C final Gradient Boosting
classifier. All fifteen important features were
created during the prior classifications tak-
ing into account C address, C motif1 and
C motif2. These features represent how ad-
dress, 1 motif, or 2 motif data, related to
a certain entity, were previously classified.
This highlights again that the information
brought in from prior classifications (first
step of the cascade) clearly contributes to
much improved entities characterization.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present a novel ap-
proach of how to attack Bitcoin anonymity
through entity characterization. Specifically,
we demonstrate how a cascading machine
learning model combined with an adequate
set of input features directly derived from
Bitcoin blockchain data (entity and address
data) as well as derived via 1 motif and
2 motif concepts introduced by Ranshous et
al. [28] can lead to impressive classification
performance for a number of relevant Bit-
coin entity classes. In fact, we were able
to obtain an average global accuracy score
of 99.68% with low standard deviation of
0.63% and a Matthews Correlation Coeffi-
cient (MCC) of 0.99 over 5-fold cross vali-
dation for a Gradient Boosting model using
our cascading approach.
These final models were indeed able
to predict each of the six entity classes
used (Exchange, Gambling, Market, Min-
ing Pool, Mixer, Service) with Precision,
Recall and F1-score values close to 1.0.
Ranshous et al. [28] obtained similar re-
sults using Random Forest and Adaboost
classifiers, however their study was limited
to exchange address classification. Jourdan
et al. [14] generally obtained lower values
for per-class F1-score and Precision ranging
between 0.67 and 1.0 using Gradient Boost-
ing and their approach involved a complex
step of model hyper-parameter calibration
and required a total number of 315 input
features.
Our approach applies one more classifi-
cation step in the ”classification cascade”
generating a set of new entity-related fea-
tures used for the final classification, but we
do not require extensive parameter tuning.
Most importantly, we only use 34 features
for the initial classification step (involving
address, 1 motif and 2 motif) and finally 7
features from the entities data set plus 3 x
6 = 18 new features obtained as outgoing
information from the initial classification
step. The final classification is thus based on
only 25 features, which equals to less than
10% of features compared to Jourdan et al.
Our future work will focus on investigating
deeper the matter of feature importance, in
order to further reduce the number of rel-
evant features required for obtaining high
entity classification performance. This will
facilitate the process of attacking Bitcoin
anonymity further.
One major drawback of our approach is
that we were not able to characterize entities
behaving as normal users as this informa-
tion is not currently available as ground
truth data in the WalletExplorer. We had
to remove all entities that have not yet
been classified in the WalletExplorer from
our analysis. Nevertheless, we were able to
detect six classes of key Bitcoin services
that have previously been associated with
illicit financial operations with very high
classification scores. We therefore believe
that our study can contribute to improving
crime investigation and may form a base
for developing effective tools assisting law
enforcement agencies in uncovering illegal
activities within the Bitcoin network.
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